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AMERICA'S UNWRITIEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND
POLITICAL ~PONSIBILITY. By Don K. Price. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 202. $19.95.
Don K. Price1 has arrived at a time of life when he could be forgiven for indulging an impluse to recapitulate or even simply to reprint
previously published views, perhaps prefacing such a work with a brief
essay highlighting the continuing relevance of any relatively dated theories and placing the various pieces in proper historical context. In

1. Emeritus professor of government and of public management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
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this volume,2 Price has done both more and less than this. On the one
hand, he has reappraised virtually all of the major issues encountered
in a long career of service to government, private foundations, and
universities, and has forged them into a thoughtful analysis of American political policymaking. On the other hand, he has done all this in
a single concise and readable volume that bespeaks a greater concern
with reaching and influencing a contemporary audience than with preserving the form of past publications.
The conciseness of his work is suitable in that Price's main concern
is the "roots of the incoherence of policy which lead[s] many critics to
wish to amend the U.S. Constitution" (p. 9). 3 The "incoherence of
policy" itself Price generally takes to be self-evident; the nature of the
perceived problem must be inferred from the proposed solutions.4 The
focus of the book is rather the underlying intellectual and social structures which determine whether our governmental institutions are capable of formulating coherent, unified policies. Price asks: "[H]ow
can we know what we should do and how we should do it and how we
may hold government responsible? That is to say, what is the authoritative source of truth on which we should rely" (p. 4)? These questions
raise broad and inherently amorphous issues, which it would be only
too easy to talk around at great length without achieving useful insight
or reform. Accordingly, Price dispenses with an extensive analytic
and bibliographic apparatus, saying, "The issues here are too broad to
be dealt with by the precise methods of the scientific study of politics
and society, but the stakes are high enough to discourage professional
timidity" (p. 14). To strike at the roots of incoherence, in other words,
one must at times run the risk of appearing opinionated and
conclusory.
In Price's case, any such appearance would be somewhat deceptive, for the groundwork for these opinions and conclusions has in fact
been laid by his previously published works, spanning more than four
decades. The thesis, for example, that America's "unwritten constitution" - "the fixed political customs that have developed without formal Constitutional amendment, but that have been authorized by
statute or frozen, at least temporarily, in tradition" (p. 9) - ought to
be the focus of reform, derives significant support from Price's early
work. In the late 1930's, Price coauthored a series of studies on the
efficacy of the "city manager" form of government in selected cities.
2. This book has also been reviewed by Genuth, Book Review, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1984, at 43.
3. An extreme manifestation of this tendency is the ongoing effort to call a constitutional
convention in order to pass a balanced budget amendment. See The Constitution as Cudgel, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
4. Price's proposals presume that a coherent policy is not simply one that leads to costeffective or nonduplicative programs. It also sets forth clear and specific goals with which voters
can agree or disagree so that the act of voting is as meaningful as possible.
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The city manager was seen at the time "as America's most promising
illustration of the need to separate management cleanly from policy
interests in the interest of economy and efficiency" (p. 172). Yet, detailed empirical study at times turned up cases such as that of Jackson,
Michigan: "The theory of the city manager plan has never been generally understood in Jackson. . . . Old political habits continued unchanged from one form of government to the other, making it
impossible under either for the electorate to exercise much control
over the policies of the administration." 5
Price was already well-educated to perceive the importance of "old
political habits" by study (begun as a Rhodes Scholar in the early
1930's) of the United Kingdom's unwritten parliamentary constitution. 6 The central lesson derived from these early studies is that new
written rules alone will never change "old political habits," and that
the key to political reform is "to command a consensus between the
major political parties . . . [that] would amount to an agreement on
how the unwritten constitution of the United States should operate"
(p. 128).
These and other earlier studies are incorporated by reference in the
instant work, primarily by the device of prefacing each chapter's footnotes with "reminiscences of the personal experiences which were responsible . . . for the opinions and prejudices that show through any
scholarly work" (p. 153). The result is two books bound in one cover
- the first a scholarly discourse, the second, in essence, Price's (abbreviated) memoirs. The use of this device reveals not only the sort of
authority ultimately relied upon in this book, but, in a sense, the sort
of authority Price suggests ought ultimately to be relied upon by government itself. Thus, a central conclusion of the book is that decisions
on "[t]he more important issues that arise at the higher levels of the
governmental hierarchy . . . ought to be controlled in the end not by
scientific data or predetermined rules but by moral and political judgment, guided in tum by a concern for the general welfare" (p. 143).
Readers may perhaps be satisfied by less rigorous documentation
when their author's "moral and political judgment" seems sound. It is
less clear that citizens in a democracy should be encouraged to defer in
a comparable way to government officials by entrusting a select cadre
of them with the "substance of policy" (p. 80). By analogy to the
British civil service, however, Price proposes just such an institution:'
"a career service heading the major departments of a government,
with lifetime commitments and a common outlook or education and at
S. H. STONE, D. PRICE & K. STONE, CrrY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN JACKSON (MICHi·
GAN) 48 (Pub. Admin. Serv. No. SP.13, 1939).
6. See Price, The Parliamentary System, 3 PUB. Ao. REv. 317 (1943).
7. An especially formative experience with regard to this proposal was Price's service on
former President Hoover's Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch.
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least partly beyond political control" (p. 76). By "common education," he means that these civil servants would be "generalists" as opposed to legal and scientific experts. 8 Price's suggestions for creating
this establishment within government include decreasing the number
and type of congressional checks on agencies and programs, creating
cabinet committees with genuine authority to formulate policy away
from the media spotlight, decreasing the numbers of political appointees, and reducing staff size in Congress and.the Executive Office of the
President.
In Price's view, giving the executive more freedom to act is the best
way to make government more accountable to the people. His new
version of the unwritten constitution would call for a disciplined Congress, in which party leaders are able to deliver or withhold support
and maintain a firm party line, to delegate to the president enough
authority to carry out and coordinate the laws. A streamlined executive office, in turn, sets the overall goals of policy and delegates authority, through the cabinet, to a cadre of depoliticized professionals who
independently work out and execute the government's programs. Accountability is assured both by the more direct causal link between
voters and government action and by the more coherent manner in
which the business of government is carried out: "In ideal terms, this
is the more democratic and responsible arrangement since it focuses
the attention of the electorate and Congress as a whole on the main
general issues, which they are interested in and competent to decide,
rather than on technical or procedural details, which they are not" (p.
141).

Thus, Price's direct answers to the difficult question he poses are
quite striking. The "authoritative source of truth on which we should
rely" in setting national policy is not religion (the written Constitution
prevents this), not science (which the unwritten constitution has relegated to a role similar to that of religion), and not law (which is not a
source of truth at all, but at best a codification of truths arrived at by
other means). It may be objected that the "moral and political judgment" Price posits instead as the ultimate policymaking guide is not
an "authoritative source of truth" either, but rather a name for the
kind of comprehensive and disinterested review of goals and anticipated effects that ideally takes place before any government program is
implemented. Nonetheless, Price argues that it is a failure to defer to
expertise in this mode of analysis which has fostered, in recent years, a
"partly scientistic and partly legalistic" (p. 93) approach to lawmaking
that precludes coherent and responsible government.
8. Nonetheless, it would probably not be unreasonable to envision this elite corps as people
very much like Price's students at the Kennedy School of Government. In terms of existing
governmental structures, the recently instituted Senior Executive Service is positioned to become
such a corps, but would have to be expanded and modified significantly to meet Price's criteria.
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Attempts to legislate scientific goals directly, without tempering
the scientists' "abstract and specialized view of the truth" (p. 58) with
a measured sense of priorities, results in programs that are liable to be
partially or wholly counterproductive.9 At the same time, the legalistic tendency to curb abuse of power through extensive congressional
oversight of agencies and programs splinters democratic responsibility
in the legislature and removes accountability from the president and
the departments.
The American voters' manifest preference for the genial generalist
Ronald Reagan over both the scrupulous scientist Jimmy Carter and
Washington lawyer Walter Mondale illustrates the timeliness, if not
necessarily the accuracy, of Price's critique. The voters' acceptance of
a president who seems to rely upon his own moral and political judgment in preference to detailed technical knowledge in his decisionmaking does not, however, indicate a willingness to permit an unelected
bureaucracy similarly to set its own policy. On the contrary, at present there appears to be a durable consensus against the creation of a
new and powerful entrenched establishment within the federal government. Price confronts this objection directly, acknowledging the existence of a deep-seated American "prejudice against establishments"
and loathing for bureaucracy (p. 77). He goes even further, and sets
up an analogy between our theological past, with its antiestablishment
bias, and our scientific present, typified by a deep attachment to academic freedom. In this scheme, absolute, unyielding truths may motivate political action so long as religious and scientific institutions are
not part of the government, nor so closely allied with government as to
dictate results inconsistent with democracy and justice. Having ratified
this American prejudice insofar as it extends to established religion
and science, Io Price maintains that we should not carry our prejudice
against establishments to the extreme of banishing policy-making expertise from government. Rather, we should see to it that there is an
institution firmly implanted in the government which can preserve coherence, fairness, and continuity in the execution of the laws.
Once a viable solution is paired in the public's mind with a pressing need, a consensus that changes the unwritten constitution may
well arise with surprising speed. While it may be easier to command a
consensus upon some of Price's proposals than others, they are all
worthy of consideration, and their presentation serves to make them
appear neither more nor less significant than they actually are.
9. The original and detailed form of this argument may be found in D. PRICE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1954); D.
PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC Es°fATE (1965).
10. An example of established science is the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which, Price observes, "in its complete dependence on government authority and support and its dedication to a
quasi-scientific ideology that justifies absolute authority, is rather like the old Russian Orthodox
church in its relation to the czars." Pp. 11-12.
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As a final point, it is perhaps also significant that Price's thought is
characterized by a pervasive, unpolarized dualism: Though fond of
thinking in two's, Price never thinks in opposites. As a youth, he was
driven to inquire into the necessity of having two Methodist Episcopal
churches in one small Virginia town, and was gratified to be told,
"Why, of course, we have to have one church for the Republican
Methodists and one for the Democrat Methodists" (p. 154). In a field
whose broadest conceivable distinction seems to be that often elusive
contrast between Republican and Democrat, this fascination with contemplating the profound differences between two things that are very
much alike - mayors and city managers, British and American government, personal prejudice and scholarly predilection - is surely a
valuable trait. Imagine his intellectual thrill when his Oxford tutor
told him: "You American students never seem to understand. . . .
Merton College has no rule against climbing into the college after midnight. It has a very strict rule against getting caught climbing into the
college after midnight" (p. 159).

